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The elusive norm of climate responsibility: The Belt and 
Road Initiative and COVID-19 
Sanna Kopra & Matti Nojonen1 
Based on the premise that climate responsibility had emerged as an international norm in the pre-coronavirus era, this paper studies 
to what extent the coronavirus is challenging the policies and strategies of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its offspring 
the Polar Silk Road.  We begin with a critical overview of the BRI and illustrate the practical implications of the fact that BRI 
lacks an official strategy, a definition and a governing institution. We elaborate what kind of discourses and standards are attached 
to the BRI in general, and its latest addition, the Polar Silk Road, in particular. On the one hand, we analyze how China's pre-
COVID-19 era Arctic policy and BRI documents (and norms) manifested and set the standards of climate responsibility, and, on 
the other hand, based on original Chinese policy documents, we debunk how these lofty political goals were rapidly and completely 
set aside as the new coronavirus epidemic was spreading around. Instead, the Party hastily made stipulations and policies and 
refocused the BRI to save Chinese overseas investments and the reputation of China in the post-coronavirus era. 
Introduction 
During the past decade or two, climate responsibility (or environmental responsibility in general) has 
emerged as an international norm that all states must comply with if they wish to be recognized as 
responsible international players (e.g., Falkner & Buzan, 2019; Kopra, 2018). Despite the shared 
objective of limiting “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015) agreed in Paris in 2015, the implementation of climate 
responsibility has been only partial and subject to competing interpretations (in some cases, even 
denial) around the globe. After the US announced to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, President 
Xi Jinping (2017a) promised that China, the biggest carbon emitter in the world, would take the 
“driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change.” For time being, however, 
China has not taken any significant international climate initiatives or implemented considerable 
emissions reductions on the national level.  Conversely, the lion’s share of China's Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) projects focus on fossil fuels (e.g., Zhou et al., 2018). To meet the objectives of the 
Paris climate agreement, making the BRI “sustainable and climate friendly” is of utmost importance; 
otherwise, “we put the world at risk from worsening pollution and severe climate change” (UN 
Environment, 2017a). Against this backdrop, this paper analyzes how the BRI has conceptualized 
climate responsibility and the ways in which it has sought to operationalize that norm in practice, if at 
all. As climate change proceeds much faster in the Arctic than in other parts of the globe (AMAP, 
2017), we pay special attention to the northern dimensions of the BRI. The melting of the Arctic will 
open up new shipping routes and economic opportunities—the key reason that many non-Arctic states 
have become increasingly interested in taking part in Arctic affairs. China, which published its first 
Arctic strategy in 2018, is no exception to this pattern: It has begun to construct an identity of “near-
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Arctic” state and renamed the series of planned Arctic shipping routes “the Polar Silk Road”. In June 
2017, the Polar Silk Road was added to the BRI, which indicates that Chinese investments in the Arctic 
can be expected to increase in the coming years. Yet the pace, scope, and focus of such investments 
will undoubtedly be affected by the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, or COVID-19, in the late 
2019/early 2020.  
In addition to health risks and human suffering, COVID-19 is expected to effect long-term social, 
economic, and political changes in international society (e.g., Aaltola, 2020; Allen et al., 2020; Stiglitz 
et al., 2020). Due to the ongoing globalization of the Arctic (see Finger & Heininen, 2018), there is no 
reason to expect that the Arctic will represent an exception in that regard. Although it may be too early 
to say whether China will emerge a stronger player in the Arctic after COVID-19, it is not difficult to 
imagine that the far-ranging consequences of the pandemic will reshape the economic and political 
dynamics of the region. We analyze the ways the Chinese government has sought to readjust the BRI 
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 and discuss potential implications for China’s activities along the 
Polar Silk road. We ask: What could the BRI investments in general, and their Northern dimensions 
in particular, look like after COVID-19, and what kind of role the norm of climate responsibility can 
be expected to play in those processes? 
We begin with a critical overview of the BRI and illustrate the practical implications of the BRI’s lack 
of an official strategy, a definition and a governing institution. Then we move to study how China's 
Arctic policy, BRI documents (and norms) manifest and set the standards of climate responsibility. 
Finally, we analyze China’s policies to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus epidemic on the BRI or 
even efforts to benefit from the pandemic, and discuss their ramifications in the Arctic. Based on an 
analysis of China’s new regulations and policy guidelines that were promulgated at the early stage of 
the escalating coronavirus epidemic in 2020, we argue that the central government reacted rapidly in 
its attempt to tackle the negative economic consequences of the epidemic. In the process, norms of 
environmental responsibility were largely dismissed, and the focus was on restarting the Chinese 
economy and limiting financial damages. We will demonstrate that major rhetorical and actual practical 
measures were taken in developing public health-related BRI operations and in illustrating China as a 
source of solution rather than as an origin of the pandemic. Some Chinese policy analysts seem to 
regard the economic setback of Western powers caused by coronavirus as an opportunity to advance 
China’s interests and BRI operations at a regional level. We will conclude that in the light of our 
analysis, there seems to be little prospects that the BRI, or its offspring Polar Silk Road, would 
constitute a driver of sustainable development or low-carbon coronavirus recovery in the Arctic or 
beyond. 
Belt and Road Initiative – what is it? 
Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI in Kazakhstan in March 2013. Later, in November 
2013, in Jakarta he broadened the BRI to include a seabound “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” At 
the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017, Xi encouraged Chinese enterprises to 
“go out,” especially along the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to ensure 
the future “improvement of living standard through sustainable development.” Eventually, at the same 
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Party Congress, the BRI was lifted into the Constitution of the Communist Party. At a juncture of this 
process, Beijing launched a third Silk Road strategy; the “Polar Silk Road” in 2017. 
Currently more than 70 countries are taking part in the BRI across Eurasia, Africa, and the maritime 
Asia–Pacific, covering more than two thirds of the global population and over one third of the world’s 
GDP (Wang & Zhao, 2019:4). As the Chinese Communist Party has injected political prestige and 
finance into the BRI, Beijing utilises these initiatives to decrease China’s dependence on the US 
markets and at the same time China is increasing its global foothold. A massive flow of investments 
and turnkey infrastructure projects is not only changing the competitive environment and balance of 
power in various corners of the world, but moreover the rather low standard of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility of Chinese companies is further constraining the environment of 
recipient countries. 
As these continent-shifting changes are taking place, despite various central government organizations 
and Xi Jinping himself has released numerous speeches on BRI it is impossible to find or construct 
any concrete strategy of BRI —a fact that raises questions and concerns about the BRI around the 
world. On the one hand, concerning the concept as such, the phrase Belt and Road Initiative suggests 
that the notion should be understood as a functional concept and process. Functional concepts are by 
definition inherently polyvalent, incomplete, and loose (Löwy, 1992). On the other hand, Beijing has 
attempted to explain or enhance the attractiveness of the BRI by attaching to it or explaining it with 
equally loose notions that are intended to generate a sense of hope, progress, values, and collective 
intentions. Consequently, we can hear Beijing repeating notions of “win-win,” “equality,” “right to 
development,” “green,” “sustainable development,” and the new global catchword of Xi Jinping, 
“community of common destiny of humankind,” side by side with the notion of BRI (Xi, 2016, 2018, 
2019). 
Although the BRI is the flagship project of China’s internationalization process, Beijing has not 
nominated any governing body to control or to provide approvals for the numerous BRI projects 
being launched by central, provincial, or local-level state-owned or private businesses. In addition, in 
December 2017, Beijing announced new restrictions and regulations guiding the approval process of 
outbound investments. The regulations encourage financial institutions to prioritize finance and 
smooth out the red tape of BRI projects. As in China all companies carefully follow the changes of 
the political wind, they are now driven to grasp the opportunity of the national priority of the BRI rage 
and novel financial BRI supportive policies. Consequently, in the pre-COVID-19 era, hundreds if not 
thousands of Chinese delegations from all corners of China were travelling on a weekly basis all around 
the world claiming to be part of the Chinese BRI, despite there being no centralized body providing 
the official BRI stamp. (As with Chinese economic data in general, this also means that the Chinese 
official statistics of BRI investments is inaccurate.) Despite an obvious lack of transparent strategy or 
governing body, the official documentation of BRI exists in the form of political speeches, a wide array 




The BRI documents and the framing of climate responsibility 
In 2015, Beijing issued the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road.” It lists the guiding principles of the BRI, which emphasize cooperation 
and peaceful coexistence, and confirm the compliance with international norms but do not explicitly 
mention environmental responsibility. Although climate change is mentioned a few times in this 
pronouncement, the document does not seek to promote the norm of climate responsibility under the 
BRI.  For instance, it states that “efforts should be made to promote green and low-carbon infrastructure 
construction and operation management, taking into full account the impact of climate change on the 
construction” (NDRC, 2015, emphasis added). Yet the document does not require that those efforts 
should actually be effective and aspiring: no quantitative emissions reductions are stipulated. 
In 2017, the “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” was issued to “build 
a peaceful and prosperous 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (NDRC & SOA, 2017). This time, green 
development was elevated as one of the cooperation priorities; the document emphasizes the 
protection of the marine environment and acknowledges the necessity of “strengthening cooperation 
in addressing climate change” (ibid.). It expresses China’s willingness to support small island states to 
adapt to climate change and pledges to encourage the development of low-carbon projects in the 
maritime sector. Yet it makes no concrete proposals as to how BRI projects could address climate 
change mitigation. 
In May 2017, the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was held in Beijing.  As 
expected, environmental issues were not high on the agenda. In his opening speech, President Xi 
(2017b) mentioned climate change only once: He proposed the establishment of an international 
coalition for green development on the Belt and Road, and promised to “provide support to related 
countries in adapting to climate change.” Yet he acknowledged that “we should pursue the new vision 
of green development and a way of life and work that is green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable” 
(ibid.). Likewise, the joint statement issued by the forum participants did not put forward an ambitious 
approach toward climate responsibility but only encouraged parties that had ratified the Paris 
Agreement to fully implement it (Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation, 2017). 
Some efforts to incorporate environmental issues into the BRI have been made. For example, the Belt 
and Road Green Development Partnership was launched by various Chinese and international think 
tanks, environmental NGOs, and foundations in September 2016 to “help China leverage and improve 
its leadership in global green governance” (China Global Green Leadership). The partnership seeks to 
promote the fulfillment of UN sustainable-development goals and the Paris agreement, and it has 
organized side events at UN Climate Conferences in 2017 and 2018, for instance. The Chinese Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (2017) formulated the “Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental 
Cooperation Plan,” which ensures that “China attaches high importance to eco-friendly Belt and 
Road” and seeks to “integrate the concepts of ecological civilization and green development into the 
Belt and Road Initiative and create a favorable pattern of well-grounded cooperation on eco-
environmental protection” by 2025. 
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Furthermore, “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road” was issued in May 2017. Although it 
defines the concepts of ecological civilization and green development as the guiding principles of the 
BRI, it seems to take a very reactive approach to environmental issues. It does not call for urgent action 
to mitigate climate change but only refers to the international trend of green development (CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council, 2017). Thus, the document does not take a strong normative stance 
in the name of environmental protection, nor does it represent China as a pacesetter in international 
environmental politics. Instead, it refers to a very general “shared responsibility for countries in the 
world to prevent and curb environmental pollution and ecological damage” and states that “efforts 
will be made to incorporate” green principles into BRI projects (ibid.). Yet, the document states that 
“promoting green Belt and Road is an essential effort to participate in global environmental 
governance and promote green development concept.” Thus, the Chinese government seemed to have 
broadened the agenda of BRI: it not only exerts “efforts to implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development in the field of coasts and oceans” (NDRC & SOA, 2017) but also 
constitutes an “important measure to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2017). According to China’s minister of environmental 
protection Li Ganjie, “To strengthen cooperation with countries involved in the Belt and Road 
Initiative through ecological protection is our joint effort to achieve sustainable development goals by 
2030” (Yang, 2018). 
The international community has also begun to pay attention to the role of the BRI in international 
governance. Acknowledging that “if Belt and Road investments lock countries into unsustainable 
infrastructure, technology, and resource extraction, this will create long-lasting negative environmental 
consequences” (UN Environment, 2017b), the UN Environment Programme and China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection launched the International Coalition for Green Development on Belt and 
Road at the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017. The coalition seeks to be an “open, inclusive and 
voluntary international network which will bring together the environmental expertise of all partners 
to ensure that the Belt and Road brings long-term green and sustainable development to all concerned 
countries in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (UN Environment, 2017b). 
By February 2019, 23 countries (Finland and Russia being the only Arctic states), 21 UN agencies and 
other international organizations had joined the coalition, among others (UN Environment, 2019). In 
April 2018, the UN Environment also prepared the Green Belt and Road Strategy, which envisions an 
engagement in the BRI to “incorporate environmental sustainability considerations across the different 
areas of focus of Belt and Road Initiative and strengthen environmental governance” (UN 
Environment, 2018). The ultimate goal of the strategy is “to ensure that investments made under the 
Belt and Road Initiative are ‘green’ and contribute to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development at the global level” (ibid.). For the time being, however, there is no evidence 
that these efforts have succeeded in making the BRI “green.” 
China’s Arctic policy and climate responsibility 
China’s Arctic involvement has grown steadily during the 2000s (see Koivurova & Kopra, 2020). In 
2004, the first Chinese research station was built on Svalbard, and since 2007, China has taken part in 
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the work of the Arctic Council, the key intergovernmental forum in the region. Today, Chinese 
scholars conduct polar research onboard the icebreaker research vessels MV Xuelong and MV Xuelong 
2—the latter, delivered in 2019, being China’s first domestically built icebreaker.  Meanwhile, Chinese 
corporations have become partners in various economic projects in the Arctic, especially in Russia’s 
Siberia, where massive projects producing liquefied natural gas (LNG) take place. The development of 
infrastructure along the Polar Silk Road is also of interest to Chinese investors. As of September 2020, 
China has not assessed its environmental footprint on the Arctic and it is difficult to estimate the 
amount of airborne and marine pollutants coming to the Arctic that originate from China. Given its 
large countrywide carbon emissions and enormous demand for extractive resources, however, it is 
probably fair to say that China plays a decisive role in shaping the resilient future of the Arctic region. 
While the Arctic was not addressed during the early stages of the BRI, the Arctic Ocean was 
incorporated into the BRI in 2017 (NDRC & SOA, 2017). In the same year, China’s high-level 
representative presented a speech titled “The Arctic in the Belt and Road Initiative” at the opening 
ceremony of the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik. In January 2018, China published its long-
awaited Arctic strategy that maintains that the BRI “will bring opportunities for parties concerned to 
jointly build a ‘Polar Silk Road,’ and facilitate connectivity and sustainable economic and social 
development of the Arctic” (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
2018). In the efforts to build a Polar Silk Road, the development of the Arctic shipping routes plays 
an important role. According to China’s Arctic white paper, the state’s goals in the region include “to 
understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the 
common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote 
sustainable development of the Arctic” (ibid.). When it comes to climate responsibility, on the one 
hand, these policy goals call for scientific research on Arctic climate change and stress the importance 
of addressing climate change. On the other hand, they celebrate economic possibilities offered by the 
melting of the Arctic ice. 
Climate change is one of, if not the, biggest problem in the Arctic (e.g. AMAP 2017). Against this 
backdrop, it is unfortunate that China’s Arctic white paper does not introduce additional measures to 
tackle climate change although it notes that “China’s emission reduction measures have a positive 
impact on the climatic and ecological environment of the Arctic” (State Council Information Office 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). Given the “highly insufficient” score of China’s nationally 
determined contribution under the Paris Agreement to limit the global temperature rise to 2oC or 1.5oC 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2019; Harris, 2017), raising the level of ambition of climate mitigation would 
be necessary to live up to China’s climate responsibility in the Arctic and beyond. However, China’s 
Arctic white paper pays more attention to the link between the Arctic climate change and the adverse 
effects of climate change in China than the ways in which the world’s largest carbon emitter could 
tackle climate change. 
The BRI can be characterized as technologically agnostic; it does not prioritize “green” technologies 
over others. Hence, it is unsurprising that China’s Arctic white paper hardly identifies any difference 
between green and brown economies but “encourages them [Chinese enterprises] to participate in the 
exploitation of oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic” (State Council Information Office of the 
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People’s Republic of China, 2018). As for clean energy cooperation, the strategy directs the country to 
“work with the Arctic States to strengthen clean energy cooperation, increase exchanges in respect of 
technology, personnel and experience in this field, explore the supply of clean energy and energy 
substitution, and pursue low-carbon development” (ibid.). For the time being, energy cooperation in 
the Yamal Peninsula, northern Russia, constitutes the key focus of China’s energy interests in the Arctic 
(see Stepien et al., 2020). As LNG is considered less harmful for the environment than traditional fossil 
fuels, China’s involvement in the Yamal LNG project supports its aims to reduce dependence on coal, 
and that in turn will reduce carbon emissions in the atmosphere. 
COVID-19 pandemic and the fate of BRI 
Political leaders and economic actors “do not have a monopoly on historical change” but “diseases, 
too, make history, although we often seem to have difficulties acknowledging this” (Hämäläinen, 
2006:2). Diseases “tend to strike undetectably and unexpectedly, ignoring all human attempts to 
contain them, and they trigger changes whose magnitude and nature often defy comprehension 
(ibid.:3). The coronavirus pandemic may well trigger fundamental changes in international society in a 
similar way that previous pandemic diseases, such as yellow fever, the Black Death, and the Spanish 
flu, among others, have initiated over the past centuries (e.g., Aaltola, 2012; McNeill, 2006; Myrdall, 
2006). Thinkers around the globe are debating whether the post-COVID-19 world will be “less open, 
less prosperous, and less free,” “poorer, meaner, and smaller,” and more China-centric, among other 
things (Allen et al., 2020; see also Stiglitz et al., 2020; Nye, 2020). No doubt the tiny virus also poses a 
severe challenge to the BRI and Xi Jinping’s promise of doubling the Chinese GDP, completely 
eradicating poverty, and doubling GDP per capita by the centennial celebration of the establishment 
of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 as compared with 2010. 
After the initial critical cover-up of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, Beijing recognized the 
outbreak of the new respiratory epidemic in the mid-January 2020. Within weeks the first coronavirus 
cases were reported in Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Italy and the US. It is likely that the 
Chinese top leadership recognized at an early stage that the virus was very contagious, represented a 
serious threat to public health, and would severely hurt the economies of impacted countries and 
threaten Chinese overseas interests. By summer 2020, Beijing began to develop a complex set of debt 
restructuring and aid-package programs that eventually will open channels for a number of defaulting 
developing countries to begin bilateral negotiations with Beijing. (Albert, 2020; Sun, 2020)  
A coordinated response effort began earlier in the last days of February 2020, the Chinese central 
government made readjustments to its BRI strategies and image campaign. On February 28, the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Commerce (MOFCOM) and the China Development Bank (ministry 
level development bank) jointly issued the “Notice on the Development of Financial Services in 
Support of the New Corona Pneumonia Epidemic to Support High-Quality Co-construction of the 
Belt and Road Projects and Enterprises” (Shangwubu, 2020). This ministry level notice is a legally 
binding policy paper stipulating how regions and institutions should support BRI companies that were 
affected by the coronavirus. Notably, the notice does not mention climate change, sustainability, or 
the Arctic Silk Road at all. 
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In practical terms, the notice outlines a series of new financial and economic measures for companies 
that have labeled their foreign investments as BRI investments and are affected by the corona epidemy. 
The notice also calls for smoothening horizontal and vertical collaboration between local provincial- 
and central government-level institutional actors. The process of selecting eligible projects and 
companies is assigned to the provincial-level branches of the China Development Bank and the 
regional headquarters of the Central Enterprises Group, the biggest and most important state-owned 
conglomerates. The notice also requires companies to report if their employees have coronavirus and 
to carry out prevention and control measures. In this manner, China aims at “winning a double victory” 
of controlling the epidemic and continuing the buildup of Belt and Road projects without losing 
economic momentum (Shangwubu, 2020). 
After the central government notice, a number of provinces launched their own response plans, based 
on their own particular strengths and development areas, for stimulating BRI projects and investments 
under the new corona situation. Some of these response plans are more detailed, like the cases of 
Guangdong and Shaanxi provinces that have 22 and 28 key tasks, respectively, while some plans, like 
Ningxia province’s, list only a handful of targets and elaborate on a more abstract level how to develop 
certain business models or hubs for their BRI activities (CABRI, 2020). In June 2020, the Chinese 
government issued a white paper detailing its fight against COVID-19, but the document does not 
deal with the BRI or mention environmental impact. 
Importantly, at the same time the Communist Party launched a coordinated strategic shift toward 
developing a public health-centered Belt and Road labeled the Health Silk Road (HSR) and began 
discussion of activating a Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. The HSR is a framework that was jointly 
launched by the BRI and WHO in 2017 as a cross-border health collaboration platform (Beg, 2020). 
The Digital Silk Road was launched in 2015 to support the development of global supply-line 
management, smart-port technology, ICT, and the sophisticated usage of big data (Wheeler, 2020). 
Both the HSR and the DSR operate under the umbrella of the BRI. The HSR was occupying almost 
the complete limelight until the coronavirus outbreak when that became the top priority of the BRI 
due to the strategic shift of Beijing (Beg, 2020). As a matter of fact, it seems that HSR became one of 
the leading themes of the BRI discourse and overshadowed the voices of sustainability and green 
development of the BRI. Intriguingly, we came across only one policy paper that took into regard the 
importance of sustainability in developing the BRI projects in the post-COVID-19 world (AIIB, 2020). 
The document was produced by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is the first 
Chinese-established multilateral finance institution and currently has 102 member states. During the 
last five years, AIIB has approved finance to 75 projects with the accumulated sum of its loans being 
2 billion USD, a sum that is minuscule in comparison to the five-year accumulated direct overseas 
investments of China, amounting to 759 billion USD. 
Arguably, the strategic shift is Beijing’s response to the amounting global criticism of its early cover-
up of the Coronavirus epidemic in Wuhan: It is an attempt to turn the crisis into a geo-economic 
opportunity and to depict China as a responsible international actor and source of solutions in this 
global crisis. The HSR activities include concrete and positive policy measures requiring health tests of 
dispatching personnel, implementing a zero epidemic human resource system, and reducing staff 
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rotation of the Chinese labor force operating abroad. As a part of HSR strategy, China has also offered 
coronavirus-related medical help and equipment to more than 90 nations expanding the original pan-
European scope of HSR to cover the whole world (RMHB, 2020). A number of Chinese scholars are 
pointing out that China should identify opportunities in risks and name public health collaboration 
and assistance as an important activity that will not only help the local communities but also safeguard 
the operative environment of Chinese companies in host countries (Chinanews, 2020). However, some 
Western countries have pointed out that not all assistance is as altruistic as Beijing portrays it to be, 
but it should rather be understood as a “mask-diplomacy” operation, i.e. a ploy to win over local’s 
hearts by providing them Covid-19 related medical assistance (Escobar, 2020; Beg, 2020). 
The overall academic and public discussion of BRI was lying dormant at the beginning of the 
coronavirus pandemic. However, some Chinese scholars point out that the pandemic is generating an 
unprecedented global crisis and as a consequence will affect the BRI activities of China as well 
(Chinanews, 2020). China is worried about a larger outbreak of COVID-19 epidemy in developing 
countries. Jin Cairong, one of the leading international relations scholars in China, writes, “If it spreads 
to countries in the South, South Asia and Africa will cause great humanitarian disasters, and even lead 
to the collapse of the social order of these countries, which will have a great impact on our Belt and 
Road Initiative” (Chinatalk, 2020). In Jin Cairong’s opinion, the crisis should be turned into an 
opportunity. He analyzes the BRI in a global context and points out that as Western European and 
North American economies are heavily affected by the virus and countries in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia have suffered less from the coronavirus, China should take “…this opportunity to fully advance 
cooperation with these two subregions ... If this is done well, in fact, our "Belt and Road" base is 
particularly good” (ibid.). 
Concluding remarks 
Over the past decade, Beijing has produced guidelines to make the BRI appear “green.” Currently, 
China is fully aware that the COVID-19 is handicapping the BRI. As the headline-grabbing BRI fell 
dormant during the first months of 2020, the central government reacted swiftly. In late February it 
issued a legally binding notice and policy recommendations aiming at deterring the negative impact 
of the coronavirus on the BRI, without assessing the environmental impact of those efforts. 
Immediately after the notice, provinces drafted their own policies aiming at stimulating the BRI 
projects. The Communist Party quickly turned the crisis into a geo-economic opportunity, by altering 
the BRI into a global public health campaign under the label of the Health Silk Road framework. In 
the public discussion, Chinese scholars are also affirming that the crisis should be seen as an 
opportunity to support the development of public health in host countries and to gain a stronger 
foothold in BRI countries. Strikingly, neither the central government, the provincial plans and 
notices nor the scholars even mention climate responsibility, green development, or sustainability in 
their BRI-related policies or scholarly opinions. As of September 2020, the only policy paper that has 
discussed issues of sustainability in the post-COVID-19 era was produced by the Chinese-governed 
multilateral AIIB that is an insignificant operator in financing BRI operations. On the other hand, 
China’s president Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly in the same month that 
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China’s carbon emissions will peak before 2030 and the state strives for carbon neutrality before 
2060. Clearly, it is of utmost importance to incorporate the BRI into these targets; otherwise, global 
emissions will not necessarily decrease but Chinese actors continue to invest in fossil-intensive 
projects abroad. 
What does this broader context mean for the future of the Arctic? Evidently, with regard to the BRI 
there have not yet been signs that China would act as a driver of sustainable development in the Arctic 
or promote low-carbon coronavirus recovery plans at a global level. Furthermore, our analysis indicates 
that the Polar Silk Road is not likely to be prioritized in any way but will continue to be a sub-initiative 
of the broader BRI. Instead, there might be a risk that China will take further advantage of the global 
economic predicament and attempt to gain stronger control of the two major sectors in the Arctic 
region: infrastructure building and natural resources. 
It is expected that the coronavirus pandemic will accelerate digitalization around the globe, including 
the Arctic, where the northernmost areas lack “reliable, accessible and affordable broadband” (Arctic 
Council, 2017a:10) and the enhancement of “connectivity” has been identified as one of the regional 
priorities (Finnish Chairmanship, 2017; see also Lanteigne, 2020). For China, investments in digital 
infrastructure constitute one of the key interests in the Arctic and are part of the broader Digital Silk 
Road initiative. For the time being, Chinese investors are involved in the Arctic Connect project 
seeking to connect Europe and Asia via the Northeast Passage. The Chinese telecommunication giant 
Huawei has also unveiled plans to deploy high-speed internet in Canada’s remote regions—a plan that 
creates new kinds of vulnerabilities in the area (Levinson-King, 2019). Given the frosty relations 
between Canada and China, however, the realization of these plans remains uncertain. As the 
expansion of 5G is viewed as a critical element of China’s economic recovery after COVID-19, it can 
nevertheless be expected that China will intensify its efforts to build a Digital Silk Road in the Arctic 
(see Blanchette & Hillman, 2020; Jüris, 2020). 
Due to the BRI’s new-found interest in health care and public health infrastructure, it is also likely that 
the Chinese actors will be interested in investing in such developments in the Arctic region— a sector 
that the Arctic Council’s One Health project introduced during the US chairmanship (2015-2017) seeks 
to improve. Yet it should be noted that the One Health project takes a holistic approach to health 
issues: it pays attention to participatory community-based approaches, addresses the “human-animal-
ecosystem interface” and seeks to “identify, prevent, and manage health risks in humans, animals and 
their shared environment” (Arctic Council, 2017b:6). In the Arctic, hence, transboundary investments 
in health should promote the operationalization of the One Health concept “to enhance resiliency of 
the Arctic inhabitants through an enhanced understanding of climatic change impacts on health risks 
to people, animals, and the environment” (ibid.). In other words, the norm of climate responsibility 
should not be dismissed in the development of health care and public health infrastructure projects, 
not to mention specific needs of Indigenous peoples—a normative foundation that all Arctic 
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